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Karma Paljor CNN-IBNNew Delhi: The near miss at the Mumbai airport between the Air India Mumbai-Delhi Flight IC 866 and an Indian Air Force helicopter from President Pratibha Devisingh Patil's fleet on Monday was not an isolated case. CNN-IBN has exclusive log book extracts that show how the President's convoy of helicopters broke rules in December at the Indira Gandhi International Airport in Delhi. Any of the cases could have proven fatal for many fliers. On December 21, 2008 at the Delhi airport, three Indian Air Force MI 8 helicopters with the President aboard prepared to take off for Meerut. The visibility was less than 1000 metres when the commander sought permission to fly in formation. The permission was denied as log extracts available exclusively with CNN-IBN show. Formation flying is allowed only when visibility is higher. The convoy acknowledged the ATC command. However, minutes later, the helicopters took off, flying in formation, breaking safety rules set by the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA). It wasn't the first time the India Air Force flouted the commands of civilian air traffic controllers, say air traffic control (ATC) sources.
On April 23, 2008, the Prime Minister's aircraft approached New Delhi. As it came in to land, an unidentified aircraft, not responding to ATC commands, came dangerously close. It was later identified as an Indian Air Force Dornier, having the call sign DO 82. In 2007 an Air Force plane flying Sonia Gandhi from Srinagar came too close to a Virgin Atlantic aircraft coming from London. The air traffic controller was suspended for procedural breach. But one of the worst near misses involving Air Force aircraft took place in January 2005, 350 km from Delhi.
A climbing Air Force plane strayed dangerously close to a Saudi Airlines Boeing, came in the path of a British Airways aircraft and finally crosses a Boeing belonging to Emirates Airways. Air Force officials and air traffic controllers admit to poor coordination but they are also quick to shift blame. Several attempts to make them work in tandem have been unsuccessful. After Monday's incident at the Mumbai airport, which put not just the President, but the lives of 148 passenger in danger, it is even more urgent that they work together to ensure safer skies.
IAF pilots didn't contact tower
Manju V, TNN
MUMBAI: The day-long investigations into Monday's horrifying near-miss involving a chopper from President Pratibha Patil's VVIP squadron have thrown up two significant facts. None of the pilots of the three IAF helicopters was in touch with the Mumbai airport tower controller and did not take landing permission before touching down on runway 27. The second that the pilot of Air India flight 866 responded in 18 seconds to the air traffic controller's instruction to abort take-off.
The Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) interrogated air traffic controllers for a large part of the day on Tuesday, even as the tower controller and the radar controller - who were on duty on Monday when the incident took place - were taken off duty till further notice. DGCA sources said both Air India pilots, Capt S S Kohli and Capt A Dewan, had been cleared and would resume duty from Wednesday.
The Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) interrogated air traffic controllers for a large part of the day on Tuesday, even as the tower controller and the radar controller - who were on duty on Monday when the incident took place - were taken off duty till further notice. DGCA sources said both Air India pilots, Capt S S Kohli and Capt A Dewan, had been cleared and would resume duty from Wednesday.
But a few things are falling into place. "The last communication between the IAF choppers and the Mumbai air traffic control was on frequency 1279 Mhz, which is controlled by the approach radar. The approach radar controller had told one of the IAF helicopters to get in touch with the tower control (frequency: 118.1 MHz) on reaching the Mumbai airport," said a source.
The helicopter pilots were supposed to fly keeping the runway in sight and report to the tower controller on reaching, seeking permission to land before actually touching down. "That was not done as the transcripts with the ATC show no communication. It also looks like the three IAF choppers also failed in their communication with each other. But the second aspect is not clear-cut yet," the source added. Another DGCA source said the helicopter which was nearly hit had the president's husband as one of the passengers.
"Fingers are being pointed at the ATC for allowing a take-off at 09.17 am, when the first IAF chopper was scheduled to land at 9.20 am," said the source from the investigating team, adding that a three-minute gap is generally enforced before and after a VVIP flight lands or departs. "But the fact that the IAF choppers did not contact the tower controller is a more serious matter," he added.
The Times of India has obtained transcripts of the radio transmission (see box) between the air traffic controllers during that crucial one minute - 9.17 am - when the IAF chopper was spotted on the runway and the Air India pilot was told to abort take-off. The visibility, at 2,000 metres, was poor on Monday and so luckily only one runway, 09-27, was in use.
"At 09.17 am, the tower controller who physically monitors the scene on the runway saw an IAF chopper landing on runway 27 and could see the Air India aircraft speeding towards it from the other end," said the source. "The recordings show that at 09:17:38 he gave a 'Indair 866 Stop Immediately' warning twice. But even after that instruction, the controller could see the aircraft picking up speed on the runway and so again the same instruction was given at 09:17:46. At 09:17:56, the pilot responded and informed that the take-off has been rejected," said the source.
Though this information came from the transcripts that the investigating team seized from the ATC, a comprehensive picture of the pilot's reaction time will emerge only from the A-321 cockpit voice recorder. "It is very likely that when the 'Stop Immediately' instruction was given the first time at 09:17:38 seconds, it was lost in the babble as a number of pilots are speaking on the tower controller's frequency (118.1MHz). Take-off is a very stressful activity with a lot of monitoring to be done,'' said a commander. ``It cannot be said whether 18 seconds was a delayed reaction time or a proper reaction time without going through all the inputs. It is likely that he commenced the reject take-off procedure seconds before he informed the ATC about it,'' said a source from the investigating team. Capt S S Kohli, commander of flight IC-866 was not available for comment despite repeated attempts.
Though this information came from the transcripts that the investigating team seized from the ATC, a comprehensive picture of the pilot's reaction time will emerge only from the A-321 cockpit voice recorder. "It is very likely that when the 'Stop Immediately' instruction was given the first time at 09:17:38 seconds, it was lost in the babble as a number of pilots are speaking on the tower controller's frequency (118.1MHz). Take-off is a very stressful activity with a lot of monitoring to be done,'' said a commander. ``It cannot be said whether 18 seconds was a delayed reaction time or a proper reaction time without going through all the inputs. It is likely that he commenced the reject take-off procedure seconds before he informed the ATC about it,'' said a source from the investigating team. Capt S S Kohli, commander of flight IC-866 was not available for comment despite repeated attempts.
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