Buy the best for Indian armed forces

Admiral Arun Prakash (retd)

WITH two military campaigns on his hands, and with the economy in dire straits, US Defence Secretary Robert Gates is reportedly stalking the corridors of the Pentagon, seeking to axe high cost weapon systems.

This has sent shivers down the spines of the US Service Chiefs, because there are unlikely to be any holy cows, and any programme, including the F-22 Raptor fighter, a new class of 100,000-ton aircraft-carriers or the army’s Future Combat System could qualify for the chop. India’s defence appropriation of Rs 141,000 crore (US $28 billion) voted on account for the coming fiscal year may be dwarfed by the US defence budget of $611 billion, but it is said to mark a notional increase of 34 per cent over last year’s funding. While we do not know exactly what proportion will remain for modernisation after meeting the post-Pay Commission revenue demands, no hatchet-wielding specter should haunt our Service Chiefs. While India’s strategic community will inevitably lament that defence spending should have received a higher proportion of GDP, the armed forces are unlikely to be overly perturbed. The frustration and quandary of the Service Headquarters (SHQ) resides in their inability to persuade the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to shed bureaucratic attitudes, and emerge from its state of stasis so that the annual budgetary allocations can be spent on vitally needed equipment for our fighting forces. However, unbeknown to the tax-payer as well the law-maker, there are anomalies in defence acquisition which go well beyond this problem. The first issue relates to the absence of institutional scrutiny and objective oversight of the force planning processes routinely undertaken by the SHQ. In the absence of a cogent articulation of national interests and security objectives by the Indian state, the armed forces, left to their own devices, have for the past 60 years, tended to plan in strategic vacuity.

This has often resulted in weapon-systems being acquired capriciously; either because they were foisted on us at “friendship prices” (or even as gifts), or because we wanted to “keep up with the Joneses” in the technology domain. Since forces built on such principles are not underpinned by a vision of our long-term national interests (which must include shaping of our future strategic neighbourhood), they may lack the capability, doctrinal as well as material, to combat all threats that emerge. The second issue is that of the huge parochial pressures (largely professional in nature), generated by the service constituencies, on their respective Chiefs. Such pressures tend to reduce the Service Chiefs to “Chieftains”, battling relentlessly to safeguard the perceived interests of their own service, rather than focusing on the common weal of national security as members of the collegial Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC).

There was a time, not too long ago, when one service would openly snipe at another, especially if it considered that its “roles and missions” were being encroached upon; aviation assets being the most frequent casus belli. Currently, a gentleman’s agreement, is in force; which forbids one service from commenting on the acquisition plans of another, provided there is no mutual interference. The natural consequence of this unstated truce is that service acquisition proposals, no matter how profligate or illogical, rarely receive the ruthless scrutiny and inquiry obligatory for requisitioning such large expenditures. The Chairman, COSC, being merely the first amongst equals, seldom presumes to undertake this hazardous task, which is then left to the less than knowledgeable mandarins of the MoD. This leads to the third issue relating to a concept known as “effect-based operations” or EBO, adopted by the more advanced and economy-conscious armed forces. EBO is explained by the following simple example. Should we want to undertake a limited precision strike on a terrorist training camp in our neighbourhood, the “effect” desired would be the delivery of “X” tons of high explosive with a specified accuracy on target.

Under the EBO concept, this mission could be accomplished with equal dexterity by air force strike aircraft, army missile or artillery units, naval carrier-borne fighters and even cruise-missile armed submarines. The actual choice of weapon system would be dictated by a variety of factors including effectiveness, economy of effort and surprise etc, but the conceptual flexibility bestowed by EBO enables wider discretion in weapon acquisition choices. Such a concept remains alien to the Indian system because currently, each service is accustomed to demanding and getting what it thinks is best for itself. For example, India must be unique amongst military powers, in that we can embark upon the acquisition of major weapon-systems like fighter aircraft, tanks and artillery in huge numbers, or nuclear submarines, and aircraft carriers costing billions of rupees without the semblance of public discussion. Neither politicians nor Parliament, and not even the MoD, have the time or inclination to dwell on many vital issues of contention: the evolving threat-environment, the technology versus numbers or technology versus manpower conundrums that exist in this context. So hardware continues to be demanded arbitrarily by our SHQ, or imposed on us imperiously by foreign governments.

Finally, perhaps the worst kept secret in the country is the predatory interest that the politician takes in every substantive arms acquisition deal that is concluded, and the hypocritical mud-slinging that follows in its wake. Unless a bi-partisan “hands-off” agreement can be reached between major political parties, the MoD will remain in a state of stasis, on this account, and defence preparedness will continue to suffer. We cannot live in this fool’s paradise forever. Defence budgets are going to start shrinking; and the people will demand accountability of Parliament, MoD and the SHQ, sooner than later. The answer lies in opening up the defence acquisition system and making it as transparent as we possibly can. Enlightened political involvement must be invited and encouraged in matters of force modernisation, which have a vital bearing on national security. Above all, we must reform our archaic and dysfunctional higher defence organisation. Little Sri Lanka, next doors, has demonstrated brilliantly, the benefits to be garnered from integrated planning and joint-service synergy in operations. Even if the politicians and bureaucrats continue to nurture irrational antipathy to a Chief of Defence Staff, let the new government, post-elections, operationally integrate our armed forces and merge the SHQ with the MoD without further ado.

The recent displays of blatant praetorianism across our eastern and western borders have served to confirm that the Indian armed forces are truly the sole sub-continental inheritors of the priceless apolitical tradition bequeathed by their British progenitors. Armies are sent into battle only when statesmen and diplomats have been unsuccessful in ensuring peace. Our Armed forces have not only fought gallantly on the battlefield but consistently and impartially upheld India’s integrity and secular democratic tradition, when all others have failed the nation. Their darkest hour occurred in the wake of Operation Blue Star; an unseen internal crisis which threatened to rend the taut fabric of discipline and loyalty which binds together our magnificent Army. The manner in which it contained and defused this calamity will remain another (untold) saga of outstanding military leadership. This monastic devotion to discipline is the reason that Subhash Chandra Bose’s Indian National Army and the Free Indian Legion are, till today, spoken of in hushed tones in the service environment. The exact details of the 1942 Royal Indian Navy mutiny (even though it imparted a decisive impetus to the freedom movement) will forever remain confined to confidential volumes kept under lock and key on board every warship.

Similarly, public expressions of defiance like hunger-strikes, dharnas, marches and demonstrations by civilians cause acute discomfort to the soldier, sailor and airman because they run contrary to the essence of all that he has been ever taught: unquestioning respect and obedience of lawful authority. Once he doffs his uniform, an ex-Serviceman (ESM) is technically liberated from the restraints of military discipline, and is free to adopt the demeanor and behaviour of any civilian on the street. But deep inside, his soul cringes at the very thought of conducting himself in a manner which would have brought disrepute to his uniform, unit or service. Why then did our ESM start resorting to demonstrations about 10 months ago, in the heart of the national capital as well as in many states? Why did they thereafter graduate to relay fasts at Jantar Mantar? And why are they now surrendering their precious medals to low level functionaries in Rashtrapati Bhavan?

Though they have conducted themselves in a most dignified and orderly manner, the very fact that veterans ranging from Generals to Jawans have been marching on the streets and squatting on footpaths has sent shock waves throughout the services community; even if the media and our fellow citizens have largely ignored this disturbing development. This writer is not about to argue the case of the ESM, but a brief summary of events would help to orient the reader. In early-2006 when the Sixth Central Pay Commission (CPC) loomed into sight, the Service Chiefs, individually and collectively, through the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), appealed to the Defence Minister, on the basis of bitter past experience, that a service member be included in the CPC. This request having been declined, when the CPC Report was released in 2008, the services found to their dismay that the recommendations expectedly contained many glaring anomalies impacting adversely on serving personnel as well as ESM. At the persistent urgings of the Service Chiefs, a Review Committee was constituted; ironically yet again bereft of a service representative. The Review Committee aggravated the anomalous situation by arbitrarily making some further unwarranted modifications.A series of instructions were issued by the Defence Accounts and pension disbursing authorities which were self-contradictory and compounded the prevailing confusion as well as unhappiness. While the Chairman, COSC, took up the issues relating to serving personnel with the Government, the ESM became convinced that since no one was listening to them, they had no choice but to adopt agitational methods. They have, therefore, taken to the streets since April 2008.

Military veterans, world-wide are objects of spontaneous respect, affection and admiration because they are national symbols of courage, patriotism and sacrifice; a segment deserving of special consideration by the government. The grievances of our ESM, should, therefore, have been handled with far more sensitivity and responsiveness, than they actually were. The current ESM movement has been able to mobilise opinion country-wide and gather self-sustaining momentum, mainly due to connectivity provided by the Internet and cellular phone networks. While the MoD seems to have adopted a disdainful and detached stance towards their grievances, the ESM roll-on agenda now encompasses canvassing political support for their cause, and even the formation of an ESM political party which will put up candidates for the forthcoming Lok Sabha elections. Thus it is now obvious that, while the nation slept, the process of “politicisation” of our armed forces is well under way, if not complete. The Sixth CPC has also inflicted serious collateral damage by deepening the existing civil-military chasm and thereby further slowing down the languid functioning of the MoD.

As a former Army Chief has pointed out, the ESM retain “an umbilical connection” with the serving personnel; they hail from the same regions or neighbouring villages and often belong to the same family. In any case, the Services and ESM are one big family. No one should have any doubts that the essence of whatever happens at Jantar Mantar or India Gate will slowly but surely filter back by a process of “reverse osmosis” to the men in uniform. Were this to happen — even by default — it would constitute the most grievous injury to be needlessly inflicted on itself by the Indian state. India’s democracy requires that the armed forces must be restored to their original pristine apolitical state at the earliest. The surest way of doing this is to remove the ESM from the streets, and the best means would be to constitute a Blue Ribbon Commission to examine and address their grievances. This can be done right now, because the Election Commission’s Model Code of Conduct does not come in the way.

Posted in: India