Should the F-117 stealth fighter be transferred to Israel? ~ ASIAN DEFENCE

By Dave Majumdar

Long standing US policy in the Middle East has been to assure the state of Israel that America would guarantee their military a qualitative edge compared to other regional powers- particularly relating to airpower. With the rising threat of Iran, Washington has been equipping other allies in the region with advanced armaments such as precision guided munitions and advanced warplanes. Often, these allies are not friendly to the Israelis, which causes unease in our only “Western” democratic ally in the area.

Another major concern for Israel is the likely proliferation of advance integrated air defense systems (IADS) by Iran and Syria. With the acquisition of such weapons by these states, Israel’s ability to maintain air dominance over the battlefield will be threatened. While Syria’s air defenses are largely composed of older Soviet designs, the Syrians have long attempted to purchase the latest Russian systems with some success. Syria has reportedly purchased advanced Russian air search radars and at least a modest number of the advanced Russian point defense surface to air missile system known as the Tor-M1 (or SA-15 in NATO terminology). Syria has also attempted to purchase the long range and extremely potent SA-20 (also known as the S-300) surface to air missile system (SAM).

Iran, likewise, has also attempted to purchase similar systems but on a much larger scale. These late generation SAMs- especially when operated as part of an integrated air defense system- pose a lethal threat to non-stealthy conventional aircraft which comprises not only the entire Israeli fleet, but also the bulk of the US arsenal. Indeed, both Israeli and US reports indicate that the SA-20 may already have been delivered to Iran-though the Russians deny these claims. In addition to the SAM threat, comes the danger from the proliferation of 4th generation fighters such as the Russian MiG-29 and Su-27 series and their derivatives around the world. These fighters are equal in most respects to current generation US built fighters such the F-15 Eagle and F-16 Fighting Falcon which comprise the bulk of the US and Israeli arsenal. In fact, certain versions of these advanced Russian built fighters are superior in one or more areas to US 4th generation fighters. Only the superior skills of Israeli and American pilots would prevent potential adversaries from gaining air superiority. However, superior training can take you only so far…

Exercises have shown that the loss rate for friendly forces flying 4th generation fighters against late model Russian designs increases dramatically as the technological edge shifts in favour of a potential adversary. A few years ago, American pilots flying the F-15 Eagle air superiority fighters during exercises faced Indian pilots flying Su-30s, a derivative of the Su-27 series, and found themselves surprised and at a severe disadvantage against the powerful Russian built jets.

Upgraded models of the Su-27 are now found worldwide, operated by even the most desperately poor Third World countries- such as Angola and Ethiopia. Advanced warplanes can be found even in the arsenals of countries such as Myanmar and Bangladesh, both of whom operate the formidable MiG-29 Fulcrum. Syria and Iran already operate the MiG-29 and there are reports of the two countries attempting to acquire even more advanced and powerful Su-27 derivatives such as the Su-30- advanced versions of which are operated by India and China. Venezuela operates a full squadron of advanced Su-30 fighters.

More disturbingly, some recent reports have suggested that the Chinese have offered to sell their powerful new J-10 fighter to Iran. The J-10 is at least an equal to the US built F-16 and is probably closer in performance to the extremely potent European Typhoon fighter aircraft according to many analysts.

If these reports prove to be correct, the Iranians would for the first time, possess a warplane capable of striking at Israel directly. The ultimate irony here being that the J-10 was developed by China with considerable technical assistance from Israel using technology developed for the now defunct Lavi project (which itself was based on the US F-16 fighter). Combined with an advanced integrated air defense system, these fighters pose a serious challenge, not only for the Israelis, but also for American airpower.

The potential threat of an Iranian nuclear weapons program is another challenge faced by the Israelis. With the procurement of advanced integrated air defenses and modern fighters by Iran, Israel does not have the capability to strike with impunity against suspected nuclear sites in that country. The Israeli strike on the purported Syrian nuclear facility a couple of years ago was deceptive in its ease as the Syrian air defenses are not nearly as formidable as those of Iran. An additional factor was that the relative distances involved were quite short. Ultimately, Israeli success may have also had as much to do with Syrian ineptitude as it did with the military prowess of the IDF (Israel Defense Force).

Another concern for the Israelis is that the relative qualitative edge that their military currently enjoys compared to their largely hostile neighbours is being eroded by an unlikely source- the United States. Keen to counter a rising Iran, the United States has approved the sale of advanced precision guided weapons such as the JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition) to such Arab countries as Saudi Arabia. In fact some Arab countries operate equipment that is comparable or in some cases superior to aircraft operated by both Israeli forces and the United States military.

The United Arab Emirates’ Block 60 F-16E/F is a prime example of an American built warplane that is superior to any version of that aircraft operated by either the US or Israel. Additionally, the recent Saudi purchase of the Eurofighter Typhoon is yet another example of an Arab qualitative advantage in terms of equipment. Of course, in terms of training, the IDF maintains a huge qualitative edge over any Arab state, however, training can only make up for so much of a performance deficit.

One quick solution the United States might undertake to immediately restore Israel’s undisputed qualitative edge in the airpower arena in the near term would be to transfer the USAF’s recently retired F117 stealth fighters to the IDF. It will not restore the Israeli advantage over Arab or Iranian operated 4th generation fighters, but it would address the issue of defeating advanced integrated air defense systems to a large extent- weapons systems that will eventually be fielded in the region (if they have not been already). That being said, only an air to air capable 5th generation fighter such as the F-35 or F-22 can address the threat of enemy fighters, but for the time being, the transfer of the F-117 Night Hawk stealth fighter is a good temporary solution.

While this idea may seem sacrilegious to many, the transfer of the F-117 is not a huge step. The United States has already agreed to export to Israel the far more advanced and infinitely more capable F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter- however the F-35 will not be available to the IDF until 2014 at the earliest. The F-35 is still in developmental flight testing and will not be operational for quite sometime. As such, the transfer of the F-117 would provide an immediate boost to Israeli capabilities and would signal a firm US commitment to Israeli security by the Obama Administration.

The F-117 has been replaced in US service by Lockheed Martin’s outstanding F-22A Raptor air dominance fighter with the surviving F-117 aircraft having been relegated to mothballs in the hangars in Tonopah, Nevada, where they were once based. However, the aging strike aircraft are still formidable warplanes. With the introduction of the Raptor, they represent a redundant capability during a time when the USAF has no money to spare.

Being a design that dates back into the 70s, the F-117 is not a particularly advanced aircraft having largely been built from off the shelf components taken from other aircraft. Its faceted design has long since been rendered obsolete by modern computer aided design technologies. Whatever classified technologies that remain onboard the aircraft- which the United States needs to protect- can probably be safely removed prior to any transfer of the aircraft. Along with security arrangements and end-user monitoring negotiated with Israel, this would protect US technology from being passed on to third parties such as China.

With the F-117 in already in storage, a program to transfer the aircraft to the IDF could begin in short order. This would bridge the stealth gap for the IDF until the arrival of the first 25 stealthy multi-role F-35s sometime during the next decade. In fact, the F-117 aircraft might enable the IDF to purchase fewer F-35s while maintaining a significant stealthy long range strike capability. The transfer of the F-117s to Israel for a nominal cost would significantly bolster Israeli capabilities without the full purchase of the currently planned 75 F-35 JSF aircraft for the IDF- which may be too expensive for Israel with the level of customization requested by the IDF (if in fact such modifications are feasible).

Even with the threats that surround Israel, a plane such as the F-22 Raptor is more capability for a much higher cost than is required by the IDF. More importantly, the F-22 was never built for export, it has none of the anti-tamper devices designed to protect sensitive American technologies built into its avionics from theft, duplication, or transfer to a third party- which is critical given the Israeli record on such matters.

Installing such technologies to the Raptor would boost the F-22’s already high cost of 130+ million dollars per unit to somewhere in the realm of 250+ million dollars per plane and may not completely guarantee the security of the aircraft’s sensitive avionics. Additionally, while the Raptor has no equal in the air dominance role- it has rather limited air to ground capabilities even with the scheduled integration of the Increment 3.2 software package in 2011.

The Raptor currently only has the capability to carry two internal 1000 lbs JDAMs. In the future however (around 2011), when it will be able to carry eight SDBs (Small Diameter Bomb) and include a SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar) radar mapping capability, it will still be less capable in the strike role and have a shorter ranger than the F-35. Granted is the fact that the Raptor will be more survivable due to it’s much greater altitude and speed. Selling the Raptor to Israel would also send a very negative signal to America’s Arab allies in addition to the technology security issues highlighted earlier. Granted also is that transferring the F-117 will not win us any popularity contests either, but it would allow Israel to deal with Iran without direct US intervention.

In short, America’s long standing policy towards Israel has been to guarantee that nations’ qualitative military edge over its largely hostile neighbours. This edge has recently been diminished by the proliferation of new and advanced weapons from the Russians, Europeans and the United States into the theatre. In order to restore the potential capabilities gap in long range strike in a high threat environment that is likely to develop in the area in the near future prior to the arrival of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the United States should supply surplus F-117 stealth aircraft to Israel.